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Relatives and friends of an end-stage renal disease patient who offer to donate a kidney are often found
to be incompatible with their intended recipients. Kidney paired donation matches one patient and his
incompatible donor with another patient and donor in the same situation for an organ exchange. Let patient-
donor pairs be the vertices of an undirected graphG, with an edge connecting any two reciprocally compatible
vertices. A matching in G is a feasible set of paired donations. We describe various optimization problems on
kidney paired donation graphs G and the merits of each in clinical transplantation. Because some matches are
geographically undesirable, and the expected lifespan of a transplanted kidney depends on the immunologic
concordance of donor and recipient, we weight the edges of G and seek a maximum edge-weight matching.
Unfortunately, such matchings might not have the maximum cardinality; there is a risk of an unpredictable
trade-off between the quality and quantity of paired donations. We propose an edge-weighting of G which
guarantees that every matching with maximum weight also has maximum cardinality, and also maximizes the
number of transplants for an exceptional subset of recipients, while reducing travel and favoring immunologic
concordance.
1. Introduction
The preferred treatment for end-stage renal disease is kidney transplantation, but there are not
enough donor kidneys available to meet the overwhelming need. As of July, 2007 there are 82,752
candidates in the United States waiting for a kidney (UNOS 2009). Often a family member or a
friend offers to donate one of his two kidneys, but approximately one-third of such offers are ruled
out because the donor’s blood or tissue types are incompatible with the intended recipient. Kidney
paired donation circumvents these barriers by matching an incompatible pair to another pair
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2with a complementary incompatibility (Rapaport 1986, Montgomery et al. 2005). In simultaneous
operations, the donor of the first pair gives to the recipient of the second pair, and vice versa. Each
donor’s surgery occurs in the same hospital as the actual recipient, so in a match between distant
hospitals, at least two people must travel.
Recently in the operations research and economics literature, investigators have used optimiza-
tion models for both the transplantation decisions of individuals [Alagoz et al. (2004) for liver
transplants, Su and Zenios (2005) for kidney transplants] and the societal allocation of organs
[Zenios (2002) and Roth et al. (2005b) for kidneys, Stahl et al. (2005) for livers]. This paper takes
the perspective of a central planner in determining a societally optimal allocation for kidney paired
donation.
In the U.S., the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) is charged with allocating organs
from deceased donors, which it does according to a points system that ranks recipients on the wait-
ing list for kidneys. On the other hand, live donation has for the most part been directed donation,
in which the donor is willing to give only to his specified recipient. Kidney paired donations must
be arranged by some clearinghouse to satisfy the reciprocal compatibility constraint: a donor will
give only if his intended recipient will receive a kidney. A kidney paired donation allocation assigns
every incompatible pair either to an exchange opportunity with another incompatible pair or to
the group of unmatched pairs. Optimal kidney paired donation can be formulated as a maximum
matching problem in a weighted graph for two-way paired donation, or more generally as an integer
program if more than two pairs may be involved in any exchange.
This paper focuses on two-way paired donation, although paired donations involving three incom-
patible pairs have been accomplished at several transplant centers, and more transplants might be
possible if three-way paired donations were permitted (Saidman et al. 2006, Roth et al. 2005a). In
the medical setting, three-way paired donations are logistically complex and are more likely than
two-way paired donations to be scuttled by the discovery of an unpredicted incompatibility or by
a medical event affecting one of the donors or recipients. In its proposal for a United States paired
donation registry, UNOS initially restricts the system to two-way paired donations based on these
clinical considerations (UNOS 2006b). Optimizing k-way paired donations for k > 2 requires an
integer programming formulation, which we discuss in Section 7.3.
1.1. Purpose and Outline
The contributions of the paper are: an overview of research in kidney paired donation allocation;
the design of clinically suitable optimization models for paired donation; and some technical results.
A paired donation allocation corresponds to a matching in a graph which may have positive inte-
ger weights on either its vertices or edges. We distinguish between maximizing the sum of vertex
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weights and maximizing the sum of edge weights, and argue that edge weights are necessary to cap-
ture important features of clinical paired donation such as travel distance and risk of immunologic
incompatibility. One desirable property of a maximum vertex-weight matching is that it simultane-
ously maximizes the number of transplants performed. Maximizing the sum of edge weights, on the
other hand, does not necessarily maximize the number of transplants performed. That is, account-
ing for important factors such as the compatibility of each recipient with his donor may reduce
the total number of transplants. For maximum edge-weight matchings, we give a constant-factor
lower bound on the suboptimality of the number of transplants performed. We also give a con-
straint on the edge weights that guarantees that a maximum edge-weight matching simultaneously
maximizes the number of transplants performed. We extend this result to consider a subgroup of
recipients for whom a transplant is medically urgent, and give an edge weighting that guarantees
that a maximum edge-weight matching simultaneously maximizes both the number of medically
urgent recipients transplanted and the total number of transplants performed. Our proofs rely on
elementary inequalities for matchings in edge-weighted graphs.
Although the concept of kidney paired donation was described in 1986 (Rapaport 1986), only
about 700 U.S. patients have received paired donations, all since 2001. Creation of a national kidney
paired donation registry in the U.S. has been delayed more than 20 years, partly because stake-
holders did not believe that logistical problems like donor travel requirements could be overcome.
We present a method for allocating matches in a national kidney paired donation registry that
simultaneously (a) achieves the absolute maximum number of paired donations; and (b) reduces
the number of long-distance exchanges and favors better immunologic (human leukocyte antigen, or
HLA) concordance. Further, we present a second allocation method to handle high-priority recip-
ients that (a) achieves the absolute maximum number of donations for the exceptional recipients;
(b) achieves the absolute maximum number of paired donations; and (c) reduces the number of
long-distance exchanges and favors better immunologic concordance for each recipient. These meth-
ods convert preemptive multi-objective optimal matching problems into maximum edge-weight
matching problems.
In addition to providing the two methods described, we hope to introduce the reader to the
breadth of theoretically and practically interesting problems in kidney paired donation. We have
two audiences in mind: the operations research community, who may verify both the utility of
graph models for allocating kidney paired donations, and our proofs that the maximum edge-weight
matchings possess the desired optimality properties; and transplant professionals, who may find
the allocation methods of great practical significance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces some clinical and
practical aspects of paired donation. In Section 3 we consider various formulations of the objective
4for allocating kidney paired donation using maximum matchings. In Sections 4 and 5, we establish
our main results, which give useful guarantees about the number of edges in a maximum edge-
weight matching when suitable restrictions are placed on the edge weights of a graph. Our suggested
method for allocating kidney paired donation is detailed in Section 5.2. Computational results are
presented in Section 6. Section 7 describes graph models for more general forms of kidney donor
exchange, especially the case of k-way donor exchange where k > 2. We discuss limitations of our
analysis in Section 8.
2. Clinical Aspects of Paired Donation
This section introduces the medical and logistical complexities of kidney transplantation in general
and paired donation in particular.
2.1. Determining Reciprocal Compatibility Between Pairs
Medically, compatibility is determined both by blood type (O, A, B, or AB) and by existing tissue
antibodies. A blood type O recipient can accept only a blood type O donor; a blood type A recipient
can accept only a blood type O or A donor; a blood type B recipient can accept only a blood type O
or B donor; and a blood type AB recipient can accept a donor of any blood type. Even if a donor has
a compatible blood type, the recipient may be sensitized to the donor, meaning that the recipient
has preformed tissue antibodies that will attack the donor’s kidney. A laboratory crossmatch test,
performed before any kidney transplant, will be positive if the recipient is sensitized to his donor.
A woman can become sensitized to her husband and children via pregnancy. A highly sensitized
recipient is one who has preformed antibodies to most of the population and so has difficulty finding
any compatible donors.
At a very few centers, programs exist to desensitize recipients so that they can receive kid-
neys from blood type incompatible or tissue incompatible donors. Desensitizing recipients involves
greater risk and cost than compatible transplantation, and the difficulty of desensitizing varies
with the particular donor and recipient. Desensitization may be used in conjunction with paired
donation, so that someone with a stubborn incompatibility to his own donor is matched to an
incompatible but more easily-desensitized-for donor (Montgomery et al. 2005).
Recipient, donor, and transplant center restrictions must also be considered in determining
whether two pairs can exchange donors in a paired donation. Recipients might refuse certain donors
because of donor age or medical conditions. Donors might refuse certain matches because of the
distance they would need to travel for donation, or because the center that would perform their
donation does not offer the less invasive laparoscopic donor operation. Transplant centers differ
in their willingness to operate on hypertensive or older donors. Registries should document these
restrictions to maximize the chances that the eventual allocation will be accepted.
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2.2. Simulations of Recipients and Incompatible Donors
U.S. transplant centers must report medical and demographic information concerning both poten-
tial organ transplant recipients and actual organ donors to UNOS through the Organ Procurement
and Transplantation Network (UNOS 2006a). However, there is no requirement and no mechanism
for reporting about willing live kidney donors who are incompatible with their intended recipients.
Indeed, because blood type compatibility problems are widely known, but paired donation is not,
many willing donors may be “ruled out at the dinner table”. Researchers in kidney paired donation
rely instead on simulated databases of patients with their incompatible donors (Segev et al. 2005a,
Zenios et al. 2001, Saidman et al. 2006). Most living donors are genetically related to their recip-
ients, so our studies include simulated inheritance of both blood type and HLA antigens (Gentry
et al. 2005). We compared our simulated patient-donor blood type distributions to registration
data for the Netherlands kidney paired donation registry (de Klerk et al. 2005) using a Pearson’s
chi-square test, and found no evidence that our simulated blood types differ from the observed
blood types (p=0.65). Although we refer to patient-donor pairs, it is best that each recipient bring
forward as many willing donors as are available. Only one of a recipient’s volunteers will donate if
a match is found.
2.3. Accumulation of Pairs
In practice, recipients and their incompatible donors present to physicians on an ongoing basis.
Zenios (2002) described an optimal controller for dynamic assignment of incompatible pairs to
either kidney paired donation or list paired donation (see Section 7.2). However, if every feasible
paired donation were performed immediately, there would be no opportunity to take advantage
of optimal matching algorithms, and fewer transplants overall could be performed. In this paper,
we view the dynamic problem as a static optimization problem. The transplant community has
recognized the need for a waiting period of three to six months during which incompatible pairs
accumulate in advance of a match run that would solve a static optimization problem.
The effectiveness of kidney paired donation programs depends on the participation of a sufficient
number of incompatible pairs. For instance, we project that the percentage of people who match
for paired donations is about 22% in pools of 15 pairs, and 38% in pools of 250 pairs (Gentry
et al. 2007). More than half of the participants will not match, primarily because of a blood type
imbalance among incompatible pairs. Blood type O recipients can only accept a blood type O
kidney, but blood type O donors can give to recipients of any blood type. Thus there will be a
relative scarcity of blood type O donors among incompatible pairs.
62.4. Medical and Ethical Priorities in Allocating Transplants
It is tempting to believe that one could define an uncontroversial utility criterion, such as maxi-
mizing quality-adjusted-life-years, for the allocation of kidney paired donation matches. Although
maximizing quality-adjusted-life-years is rational for an individual making medical decisions, in a
centralized allocation system the years of life resulting from transplants would benefit some indi-
viduals and not others. Ensuring an equitable allocation might conflict with ensuring efficiency. For
instance, it would not be acceptable to deny transplantation to a particular ethnic minority, even if
survival after transplantation is lower for members of that minority than for other populations. As
another example, giving priority to recipients who have themselves been prior live donors seems an
equitable recompense for the gift they have given, regardless of whether such a priority increases
efficiency by encouraging more people to become live donors.
The existing allocation system for deceased donor kidneys can be viewed as a compromise
between efficiency and equity; see Zenios et al. (1999) for a detailed examination of the trade-off
between these objectives in the allocation of deceased donor kidneys. The deceased donor system
(UNOS 2006c) gives priority, for example, to candidates who are difficult to match (sensitized)
or who are children, and gives infinite priority to any kidney allocation with perfect immunologic
concordance (zero-mismatch). For an account of conflict between individual autonomy and system-
wide utility in the deceased donor allocation system, see Su and Zenios (2005). We will say more
about the choice of optimization objective for kidney paired donation in Section 3.
2.5. Efforts to Create Kidney Paired Donation Registries
The U.S. currently lacks a centralized kidney paired donation registry. A few regional consortia
exist, and several transplant centers maintain lists of recipients with incompatible donors. The great
promise of kidney paired donation led to the passage of a bill removing legal barriers to a national
paired donation matching registry (U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives 2007). Also,
UNOS has released a detailed proposal for a kidney paired donation registry (UNOS 2006b). A
U.S. national registry is projected to increase the rate of live donation substantially. A registry will
also save the medical system hundreds of millions of dollars (Segev et al. 2005b). The government
will realize financial benefits from paired donation because dialysis automatically qualifies patients
for Medicare, and because dialysis is more costly than transplantation.
Both South Korea (Park et al. 1999) and the Netherlands (de Klerk et al. 2004) currently operate
national kidney paired donation registries. The Korean registry models allocation as a preemptive
multi-objective optimization problem and solves it by enumerating all feasible allocations (Kim
et al. 2007). While enumeration is a correct solution method, it will fail due to combinatorial
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explosion if the registry grows to even a moderate size (the largest pool reported had 39 patient-
donor pairs). The matching procedure used in the Netherlands does not guarantee an efficient
matching; rather, it uses a greedy algorithm to add edges to the allocation in order of increasing
match probability of both recipients, as defined in Keizer et al. (2005). One may construct an
example in which this procedure matches a set R of recipients even though it is possible to match
all recipients in R and some other recipients, too. However, we can not determine whether this has
actually occurred. Canada’s national kidney paired donation registry began operation in 2008, and
uses an edge-weighted graph optimization model as elaborated in this manuscript.
3. Objectives for Optimal Matchings in KPD Graphs
We represent reciprocal compatibility between incompatible pairs by edges in an undirected graph
G. Each vertex of G represents an incompatible patient-donor pair, and each edge represents a
feasible match. That is, there is an edge between two vertices of G whenever the donor of the first
pair is compatible with the recipient of the second pair, and also the donor of the second pair is
compatible with the recipient of the first pair. We refer to G as a KPD graph.
3.1. Matchings in Kidney Paired Donation Graphs
A matching M in a graph G is a set of edges in G such that every vertex of the graph is incident
with at most one edge of M . The matching number µ of G is the maximum number of edges in a
matching in G. There is a vast literature on matchings, matching numbers, and their applications.
(See the classic paper by Edmonds (1965), the book by Lova´sz and Plummer (2009), and the survey
in Pulleyblank (1995).)
Any feasible allocation of kidney paired donations within a KPD graph G is a matching. A
KPD graph is not bipartite in general, since any incompatible pair may in theory be reciprocally
compatible with any other.
It is likely that individuals will have slight preferences among their feasible donors. A stable
matching is one in which no two participants prefer each other to their matched partners. Suppose
the registry matches a with b and c with d, but b prefers c to a, and c prefers b to d. Then the registry
has produced an unstable matching. Theoretically, b and c might leave their allocated matches
and instead match with each other for a kidney paired donation. Although stable matchings are
desirable in many applications of matching theory (Gusfield and Irving 1989), we claim that it is
neither possible not particularly useful to require stability of the allocation matching for kidney
paired donation. First, some graphs might not possess a stable matching. Gale and Shapley (1962)
give an example. Second, the pairs are unlikely to have enough information to articulate their
preferences, or to arrange a paired donation outside of a sanctioned registry. A laboratory and
8the complicity of the medical establishment are required even to determine whether two pairs are
mutually compatible, to say nothing of the operations.
There are several notions of optimality for the matching M . One approach is to view all kidney
paired donations as equally valuable. Then the matchingM is optimal provided it has the maximum
cardinality µ. However, maximizing the number of transplants is only one of many goals that
physicians wish to achieve in allocating kidney paired donation. We now discuss two variant notions
of optimality in which weights (positive real numbers) are assigned to the vertices or edges of G to
signify preferences among matchings.
The vertex-weight of a matching is the sum of the weights of the incident vertices. The edge-weight
of a matching is the sum of the weights of its edges. If weights are assigned to the vertices of the
KPD graph, then the objective will be to obtain the maximum vertex-weight matching. Otherwise,
if weights are assigned to the edges, then the objective will be to obtain the maximum edge-weight
matching. Edge-weighted matchings include vertex-weighted matchings as a special case when the
weight for each edge is defined as the sum of the weights of the vertices connected by that edge.
Furthermore, edge-weighted matchings have an advantage over vertex-weighted matchings in KPD
graphs.
Figure 1 A kidney paired donation graph for four patient-donor pairs
Consider the simple KPD graph G in Figure 1. Two distinct matchings in G use all four ver-
tices. A vertex-weighted scheme must fail to differentiate between the matching that includes two
long-distance exchanges between Boston and Atlanta, and the matching that includes only local
exchanges within the two cities, since all four vertices are included in either matching. An appro-
priate edge weighting of G, however, would assign larger weights to the bold edges so that the
maximum edge-weight matching is the one that involves local exchanges within the two cities.
3.2. Factors that can be captured using vertex weights
To express priorities among patients, Roth et al. (2005b) propose assigning a weight to each
vertex of G. Organ allocation policy has long recognized several special categories of transplant
candidates: pediatric candidates, the medically fragile, or candidates disadvantaged by restricted
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compatibility. A medically fragile candidate is one whose need for a transplant has become urgent.
In the disadvantaged category, a highly sensitized candidate has a wide range of existing antibodies
that make the search for a compatible donor like looking for a needle in the haystack. Physicians
recognize at least two objectives: maximizing transplants for prioritized patients, and maximizing
transplants overall. There is no trade-off necessary to maximize both, because maximum vertex-
weight matchings always have maximum cardinality, as we show in Section 4.1.
3.3. Factors that can only be captured as edge weights
The desirability of a particular paired donation allocation actually depends on both edge properties
and vertex properties. To express priorities among feasible kidney exchanges, we have proposed
assigning a weight to each edge of the KPD graph G (Segev et al. 2005b). Of course, a maximum
edge-weight scheme can also consider factors related to vertices, such as the pediatric or prior live
donor status of a recipient, by adding the weight attributable to a vertex property to the weight
of every edge incident on that vertex.
We argued above that travel requirements are an edge property that cannot be captured using
vertex weights. This section discusses this and other clinically important factors that can only be
captured as edge weights.
In a match between pairs at geographically distant transplant centers, the donor of each pair is
expected to travel to his actual recipient’s transplant center. Not only does this separate family
members during the operations and recovery, but donor travel costs are not reimbursed by insur-
ance. Long-distance matches would be restricted to those with the means to fund them, which
could cause socioeconomic disparity in access to paired donation. Also, a system that requires most
donors to travel would likely discourage participation.
Although kidney donors and recipients need not be related for a good outcome of the transplant,
the extent of immunologic concordance between donor and recipient affects survival rates for the
kidney. There are six relevant human leukocyte antigens (HLAs) for each person, and reported 5-
year survival percentages for a zero-, three-, and six-mismatch live donor kidney are 89%, 74%, and
60%, respectively (Opelz 1997). Analagous differences in survival rates for deceased donor kidneys
prompted UNOS to make an exception to its normal allocation rules for these organs. Transplants
that would be zero-mismatch are given absolute priority (UNOS 2006c). Still, some members of
the transplant community believe that recent advances in immunosuppressive drugs have reduced
the importance of closely matched HLA between donor and recipient (Su et al. 2004).
Other factors such as the age and medical history of donor and recipient could be used in addition
to HLA matching to generate edge weights that express the expected gain in life-years for each
particular donor and recipient pairing. This would, for example, make it more likely that a kidney
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from a younger donor goes to a younger recipient who can take advantage of the graft’s full usable
lifespan.
There is an association between sensitivities to HLA antigens in various cross-reactive groups,
so that some sensitivities may predict other sensitivities. Using cross-reactive group data, the
likelihood of a positive crossmatch between any two people could be predicted prior to a laboratory
test. Including this prediction in edge weights would mean that fewer exchanges in the optimal
allocation will be scuttled by an unpredicted positive crossmatch. In similar fashion, if a few centers
can desensitize recipients to some incompatible donors, edge weights might reasonably depend on
the level of difficulty expected in desensitizing recipients to particular donors.
Finally, transplant centers must be assured that feasible matches between pairs who are both at
their center will receive priority. Otherwise, large centers with the ability to perform many paired
donations among their own patients will have a disincentive to include their patients and donors
in a national registry.
In each of the issues above, it is the fit between the donor of the first pair and the recipient
of the second pair, and the reverse, that is critical to determining the benefit of an exchange. To
incorporate any of the considerations of this section, edge weights must be used to discriminate
among matchings that contain different edges but give paired donation opportunities to an identical
set of recipients.
4. Contrasting Maximum Vertex-Weight Matchings to Maximum
Edge-Weight Matchings
In this section, we prove several statements about the number of edges in any maximum vertex-
weight or maximum edge-weight matching in a graph. We give our proof of the familiar result
that any maximum vertex-weight matching also has maximum cardinality. In contrast, at least
one maximum edge-weight system using clinically motivated weights tested by UNOS in a recent
computational study resulted in about 3% fewer transplants than were actually possible. (UNOS
2006b). We show that in the worst case, the number of edges in a maximum edge-weight matching
may be only half the number of edges in a maximum cardinality matching. Then, we make stronger
claims about the number of edges included in a maximum edge-weight matching under the assump-
tion that there are only small differences between any two edge weights. If all the edge weights are
close together in a sense we will describe, we prove that a maximum edge-weight matching will
have exactly the maximum cardinality. We conclude by suggesting an edge weighting for kidney
paired donation that will allow important edge properties to be considered while maximizing the
number of transplants performed.
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4.1. Maximum Vertex-Weight Matchings
The (vertex-) weighted matching number µv of G is the maximum number of edges among all
matchings with maximum vertex-weight in G. The following result assures us that specifying higher
priorities to some patients does not decrease the total number of patients receiving transplants.
Proposition 1. In a vertex-weighted graph with positive vertex weights any matching with maxi-
mum vertex-weight also has maximum cardinality. In other words, µv = µ.
We isolate the main idea of the proof of Proposition 1 in a lemma, which is a reformulation of a
fundamental result in graph theory discovered by Berge (Berge 1957, 1972). We let V (M) denote
the set of vertices in a matching M .
Lemma 1 (Matching Lemma). Let G be a graph with matching number µ. Let M∗ be any match-
ing in G. Then there is a matching M with µ edges such that V (M∗)⊆ V (M).
Figure 2 Some components of the subgraph H in the proof of the Matching Lemma. The bold edges are in the
maximum matching M , the unbolded edges are in the matching M∗, and the bold dashed edges are in
both of the matchings M and M∗.
Proof of the Matching Lemma. Let M denote any maximum matching of G. We will replace
some edges of M by an equal number of edges of M∗ to bring about the containment V (M∗)⊆
V (M). It will not be necessary (and it may not be possible) to include all edges of M∗ in a
maximum matching M . Consider the subgraph H of G whose vertex set is V (M∗) ∪ V (M) and
whose edge set is M∗ ∪M . Each connected component of H is either an even cycle or a path with
edges alternating between M and M∗, or an isolated edge belonging to both M and M∗. (See
Figure 2.)
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The vertices of V (M∗) in any even cycle are already in V (M). In a path with an odd number of
edges, the edge at each end must occur in M since M is a maximum matching, and it is clear that
V (M∗)⊆ V (M). In paths with an even number of edges the two matchings use the same number
of edges, and we may replace the edges of M by those of M∗ (as illustrated in Figure 2) to bring
about the containment V (M∗)⊆ V (M). The vertices of V (M∗) in an isolated edge belonging to
both M∗ and M are already in V (M). 2
The Matching Lemma immediately implies Proposition 1. Let Mv be a maximum vertex-weight
matching with µv edges. Then there is a maximum cardinality matching M that satisfies V (Mv)⊆
V (M). If V (Mv) 6= V (M), then the vertex-weight of M is strictly greater than the vertex-weight
of Mv, contrary to the definition of Mv. Therefore V (Mv) = V (M), and thus µv = µ. The result in
Proposition 1 is well-known; see Roth et al. (2005b) for a demonstration in a different context.
4.2. Worst-case Cardinality of Maximum Edge-Weight Matchings
The (edge-) weighted matching number µe of G is the maximum number of edges among all match-
ings with maximum edge-weight in G. Clearly,
µe ≤ µ. (1)
Unfortunately, the analogue of Proposition 1 fails. For instance, the edge-weighted graph in Figure 3
has matching number µ= 6 and edge-weighted matching number µe = 3. In this example, the ratio
µe/µ equals 1/2. The following result shows that the ratio cannot be any smaller.
Figure 3 A maximum cardinality matching (bold edges) has six edges, while a maximum weight matching has
three edges. The labels are the edge weights.
Proposition 2. In an edge-weighted graph with positive edge weights, a matching with maximum
edge weight has at least half as many edges as a matching of maximum cardinality. In other words,
µe ≥ 1
2
µ. (2)
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Proof. Let Me be a maximum edge-weight matching, and let M be a maximum matching
of G. As in the proof of the Matching Lemma, consider the subgraph H of G with vertex set
V (Me)∪V (M) and edge set Me∪M . Again, each connected component of H is either an even cycle
or a path. (See Figure 2.) We will show that the inequality µe/µ≥ 1/2 holds for each connected
component of H. The inequality (2) then follows.
An even cycle satisfies µe/µ= 1, as does an even path. Any odd path in H with k edges has its
first, third, . . ., kth edge in M and its second, fourth, . . ., (k−1)th edge in Me. There are (k−1)/2
edges ofMe and (k+1)/2 edges ofM on an odd path with k edges, so we have µe/µ= (k−1)/(k+1).
This ratio is at least 1/2 unless k= 1. However, an odd path with one edge cannot occur in H since
this would correspond to an isolated edge belonging to either M or Me but not both, violating
either the maximum cardinality of M or the maximum edge-weight of Me. 2
The prospect of producing a maximum edge-weight allocation with µe near µ/2 is unacceptable.
We proceed by restricting the class of edge weightings to obtain stronger guarantees. In Section 4.3
we will assign the edge weights in a manner that guarantees µe = µ.
Note that the preferences specified by vertex weights can always be captured by suitable edge
weights. Let Gv be a arbitrary vertex-weighted graph, and let Ge be an edge-weighted graph in
which the weight of each edge equals the sum of the weights of the two incident vertices in Gv.
Proposition 3. A matching has maximum vertex weight in Gv if and only if it has maximum
edge weight in the corresponding edge-weighted graph Ge.
Proof. By the manner in which the edge weights are defined, the vertex weight of any matching
in Gv equals the edge weight of the same matching in Ge. It follows that a matching has maximum
vertex weight in Gv if and only it has maximum edge weight in Ge. 2
4.3. A Theorem on the Cardinality of Maximum Edge-Weight Matchings
If the edge weights of G are all equal, then µe = µ, of course. We will show that the equality µe = µ
still holds provided the edge weights are nearly equal. Moreover, if the edge weights are not nearly
equal, there is a lower bound for the fraction µe/µ.
Theorem 1. Let G be an edge-weighted graph whose edge weights are all at least w and at most
W (0<w≤W ). Let µ and µe be the matching number and edge-weighted matching number of G.
Then
µe ≥
( w
W
)
µ. (3)
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Also, if G has n vertices and w 6=W , then
W
W −w >
⌊n
2
⌋
implies µe = µ. (4)
Moreover, when the inequality in (4) holds, then every maximum edge-weight matching has maxi-
mum cardinality µ.
Proof. Consider two matchings M and Me in G with maximum cardinality and maximum
weight, respectively. Of course, the weight of M is at most the weight of Me. Also, the weight of
M is at least wµ, while the weight of Me is at most Wµe. Therefore Wµe ≥wµ, and inequality (3)
follows.
Because µ and µe are integers, inequality (3) implies that µe = µ if (w/W )µ>µ− 1. This latter
inequality is equivalent to W/(W −w)> µ if we assume that w 6=W . In any graph the matching
number satisfies bn/2c ≥ µ, and thus the implication (4) holds. The argument above remains valid
when µe is replaced by |Me|, the cardinality of an arbitrary maximum edge-weight matching. Thus,
whenever the premise of (4) holds, every maximum edge-weight matching has maximum cardinality
(|Me|= µ). 2
4.4. Edge Weightings Suggested by Theorem 1
Let G be a KPD graph with n vertices, matching number µ, and weighted matching number µe. The
edge weight restriction of Theorem 1 forces the desirable equality |Me|= µe = µ. It guarantees that
every maximum edge-weight matching reflects a quantitative efficiency precept: Any two kidney
paired donations are better than any single kidney paired donation.
Theorem 1 points the way to an allocation algorithm for kidney paired donation using the KPD
graph G. We assign the weights
W = n+ 1 to each preferred edge of G,
and w = n− 1 to each non-preferred edge of G.
An edge is preferred provided the two pairs have ready access to the same hospital, say, or the degree
of immunologic concordance meets some desired threshold. Because W/(W − w) = (n + 1)/2 >
bn/2c, by (4) we have µe = µ. Then the edges of Me, any maximum edge-weight matching in G, give
an optimal set of organ exchanges. This allocation maximizes the total number of kidney paired
donations while simultaneously reducing travel and increasing immunologic concordance.
In the simplified method presented above, the edge weights take on just two values. No matching
with maximum cardinality in G uses more preferred edges than Me. In a more refined model we
may specify degrees of preference by assigning edge weights to be real numbers in the closed interval
[n− 1, n+ 1]. We expand on this idea in Section 5.2.
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4.4.1. A Wider Interval of Edge Weights It is not clear whether the medical community
will always prefer an allocation that maximizes the total number of transplants. It appears that
UNOS may accept a small penalty in overall number of transplants if other allocation objectives
are improved (UNOS 2006b). Using (3), we can still offer a guarantee about the size of every
maximum edge-weight matching if the clinically appropriate edge weight interval exceeds that in
Theorem 1. If ethical considerations allow a matching which is a fraction 1−  of the maximum
cardinality µ, then by inequality (3) we may select our edge weights in any scaled version of the
interval [1− ,1].
5. Generalizing Beyond The Objectives of Cardinality and Edge-Weight
5.1. Maximum Edge-Weight Matchings with Exceptional Recipients
Another reasonable allocation objective is to maximize transplants for a very small group of excep-
tional recipients. Luckily, this is possible within the constraint of arranging the largest possible
number of transplants, and in addition to prioritizing edge properties like immunologic concor-
dance. Surgeons cite the example of patients who have run out of dialysis access and therefore
can not be dialyzed. For this group of recipients, a transplant is truly life-saving. In what fol-
lows, we consider an edge-weight system that parallels the one in Section 4.3, with the additional
specification of an exceptional group of high-priority recipients.
5.1.1. A Theorem on Edge Weights for Exceptional Recipients. Let G = (V,E) be
a KPD graph with n vertices. Consider the vertex partition V = V1 ∪ V2, where each vertex in
V2 represents an exceptional recipient with his donor(s). We anticipate that V2 will have smaller
cardinality than V1. A matching M has maximum V2-cardinality provided no matching in G is
incident with more vertices of V2 than M . Our goal is to assign edge weights to reflect the high
priorities of the vertices in V2. Let the edge weight for each edge be the sum of: a number b > 0, a
number B > 0 for each vertex in V2 that is incident with the edge, and a number from the interval
[0,2]. Consider the edge partition E =E1∪E2∪E3, where Ek is the set of edges of G with exactly
k− 1 vertices in V2 for k = 1, 2, 3. (See Figure 4.) Then the edge weight of each edge in E1, E2,
and E3 lies in the respective closed interval
[b, b+ 2], [b+B, b+B+ 2], and [b+ 2B, b+ 2B+ 2]. (5)
The number b expresses the priority given to raw cardinality, the number B expresses the priority
given to the vertices of V2, and the number in [0,2] expresses any other desirable properties of
a match, say, with larger weights corresponding to shorter travel distance or higher immunologic
concordance.
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Figure 4 Vertex and edge subsets
Theorem 2. Let G be an edge-weighted graph with vertex partition V1 ∪ V2, edge partition E1 ∪
E2 ∪ E3, and edge weights in the intervals in (5), with b > 0 and B > 0. Let G have matching
number µ and edge-weighted matching number µe.
(a) If
b ≥ n− 1, (6)
then µe = µ, and every maximum edge-weight matching has maximum cardinality µ.
(b) If
B > n, (7)
then every maximum edge-weight matching has maximum V2-cardinality.
Part (a) asserts that, subject to condition (6) on b, every maximum edge-weight matching has
maximum cardinality. Part (b) asserts that, subject to condition (7) on B, a maximum edge-weight
matching also has maximum V2-cardinality. If the premises (6) and (7) are both satisfied, then
a maximum edge-weight matching has both maximum cardinality and maximum V2-cardinality.
Thus our edge-weighting scheme has desirable properties for kidney paired donation.
Preliminaries to the proof of Theorem 2. First consider a vertex-weighted graph Gv, where
every vertex in V1 has weight b/2, and every vertex in V2 has weight (b/2) +B. Let µv and µ be
the matching number and vertex-weighted matching number of Gv. By Proposition 1, a maximum
vertex-weight matching in Gv has maximum cardinality, and so µv = µ. We claim that any maxi-
mum vertex-weight matching Mv has maximum V2-cardinality. To see this, note that the Matching
Lemma tells us that there is a maximum cardinality matching M with V (Mv)⊆ V (M). It follows
that M has maximum V2-cardinality. Because B > 0, M must have greater vertex weight than any
maximum cardinality matching that does not have maximum V2-cardinality, and so all maximum
vertex-weight matchings must also have maximum V2-cardinality.
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We construct Ge, the edge-weighted graph corresponding to Gv, where the weight of each edge
is the sum of the weights of the two incident vertices. By Proposition 3 any maximum edge-weight
matching Me in Gv has maximum vertex weight. From the argument above, Me also has maximum
cardinality and has maximum V2-cardinality. Each edge weight of Ge equals b, b+B, or b+ 2B,
depending upon the number vertices of V2 incident with the edge.
We now amend the edge weights of the graph Ge, adding to each edge any number in the interval
[0,2], to create a new graph G. Since the two graphs have the same set of edges, µ(G) = µ(Gv).
We use the generic µ to refer to the identical matching number of G and Gv. We will show
that µe(G) = µ if (6) holds, and that any maximum edge-weight matching in G has maximum
V2-cardinality if (7) holds.
Proof of (a). We proceed by contradiction. Assume that µe(G)<µ. Then because µe and µ are
integers, µe(G)≤ µ− 1. Let the weight of every maximum edge-weight matching in Ge be K. The
weight of a maximum edge-weight matching inG is at mostK−b+2(µ−1), because it has one fewer
edge (subtracting at least b) but may gain as many as 2(µ− 1) units of weight from the amended
weights of G. But by assumption (6), K− b+ 2(µ−1)≤K−n−1 + 2µ≤K−n−1 + 2bn/2c<K.
The last inequality holds because 2bn/2c ≤ n. Then the weight of a maximum edge-weight matching
in G is strictly less than the weight of every maximum edge-weight matching in Ge, even though
no edge weight in Ge exceeds the corresponding edge weight in G. This is a contradiction.
Proof of (b). We proceed by contradiction. Assume that some maximum edge-weight matching
Me(G) does not have maximum V2-cardinality. Again let the weight of every maximum edge-
weight matching in Ge be K. The weight of a maximum edge-weight matching in G is at most
K −B + 2µ, because it contains at least one fewer vertex from V2 (subtracting at least B), and
may gain as many as 2µ units of weight from the amended weights in G. But by assumption (7),
K −B + 2µ < K − n+ 2µ ≤K − n+ 2bn/2c ≤K. Again the weight of a maximum edge-weight
matching in G is strictly less than the weight of every maximum edge-weight matching in Ge, and
we have a contradiction. 2
5.2. Edge Weightings for Clinical Paired Donation Registries.
Deciding what constitutes the best allocation is outside the scope of mathematics. Those determi-
nations must be made by the transplant community in a manner that reflects both judgment and
values, as discussed in Section 2.4. UNOS has already narrowed the list of potential considerations
in weighting the edges to the following: geography (same transplant center, same state, or same
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UNOS region), zero-mismatches, prior live donor recipients, pediatric recipients, sensitized recip-
ients, and waiting time. Policy-makers at UNOS have hand-tuned various edge-weight schemes
using simulated KPD graphs to arrive at their current proposal (UNOS 2006b). Theorem 1 and
Theorem 2 provide some guarantees regarding the effect of selecting particular numerical weights.
If the correct clinical model is to order the cardinality objective(s) strictly ahead of other objectives
in the ways we have described, then policy-makers may safely select the edge weights from the
specified intervals. Our theorems guarantee that the maximum edge-weight matchings solve the
corresponding preemptive multi-objective problems.
The results presented here suggest a simple calculation to assign edge weight wi to edge i in
practice. Initially, assign a weight w˜i in the closed interval [0,2] to edge i. The number w˜i may be
assigned on the basis of edge properties, such as the relative medical and geographic desirability
of particular matches. Also, w˜i may be assigned on the basis of vertex properties, such as whether
recipients are pediatric or prior live donors, when these recipients are not classified as exceptions.
Once n (the total number of patient-donor pairs) is known, add b= n−1 to each edge weight w˜i
to get the weight wi for edge i. If the consensus among physicians is that quantitative efficiency is
required, then each edge weight falls in the interval [n− 1, n+ 1]. The advantageous conclusion of
Theorem 1 applies.
On the other hand, say that the desired allocation does not require quantitative efficiency, but
a subset V2 of exceptional vertices has been identified. Then we add B = n+ 1 to each edge weight
w˜i for each vertex in V2 incident with edge i. Thus either 0, n+1, or 2n+2 is added to w˜i. Because
no edge should have weight zero, we add a small number to each edge, say, 1. The resulting edge
weights are within the intervals
[1, 3], [n+ 2, n+ 4], and [2n+ 3, 2n+ 5]. (8)
These edge weights might be suitable if there are some exceptional recipients, but policy-makers
are willing to trade off overall cardinality to achieve, say, greater reductions in travel. Then part
(b) of Theorem 2 applies, and as many exceptional recipients as possible will be matched.
If physicians require both quantitative efficiency and the maximum number of transplants for
exceptional recipients, then we add n− 1 to every edge, and we also add B = n+ 1 to each edge
weight wi for each vertex in V2 incident with edge i. The edge weights will fall in the intervals
[n− 1, n+ 1], [2n, 2n+ 2], and [3n+ 1, 3n+ 3], (9)
and both of the reassuring conclusions of Theorem 2 hold. Donors and recipients can have confidence
in an organ allocation system that maximizes the number of people who receive a transplant, and
that gives absolute priority to exceptionally deserving recipients, and that also takes into account
other important concerns.
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5.3. Restricting Edge Weights Is a Multi-Objective Optimization Method
It is instructive to recast Theorem 2 and the discussion in Section 5.2 as a preemptive (lexico-
graphical) multi-objective optimization method. Klingman and Phillips (1984) construct a similar
method for a related model, a preemptive multi-objective assignment model.
Recall that the number of vertices in a matching M is |V (M)|. Let |V2(M)| be the number of
vertices of M that are in the subset V2. In decreasing order of importance, the objectives we consider
for kidney paired donations are: f1(M) = |V2(M)|, the number of transplants for the highest priority
recipients; f2(M) = |V (M)|, the number of transplants overall; and f3(M), a function that may
subsume various other vertex-associated objectives, such as the number of transplants for preferred
but not exceptional recipients, as well as edge-associated objectives, like travel and immunologic
concordance.
Let M be the set of all matchings in G. We express the constraints in the generic form: M ∈M.
The general theory of multi-objective combinatorial optimization asserts (Ehrgott and Gandibleux
2000) that for an ordered list of objectives f1(M), f2(M), . . ., fk(M) there exist preemptive weights
C1, C2, . . ., Ck such that the preemptive multi-objective problem is equivalent to
max
M∈M
k∑
i=1
Cifi(M). (10)
One may solve (10) using a maximum edge-weight matching algorithm.
Without loss of generality Ck = 1, and in our case k= 3. Theorem 2 provides exact values for C1
and C2. Write the maximum edge-weight matching problem as
max
M∈M
∑
j∈M
wj = max
M∈M
(
(n+ 1)|V2(M)|+ (n− 1)|V (M)|+
∑
j∈M
w˜j
)
(11)
and note that the objective on the right hand side of (11) is a linear combination of the objectives
f1, f2, and f3. This yields C1 = n+ 1 and C2 = n− 1 as preemptive weights for (10).
An alternative method for solving preemptive multi-objective problems is as a sequence of single-
objective problems. In that paradigm, first solve
F1 = max
M∈M
f1(M) (12)
and then solve
F2 = max
M∈M
f2(M), subject to F1 = f1(M), (13)
which incorporates maximizing the most important objective as a constraint, and then solve,
F2 = max
M∈M
f3(M), subject to F1 = f1(M) and F2 = f2(M), (14)
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and so on. The advantage of the former method which combines the objectives into a single one is
that an efficient algorithm for matching can be used, whereas there is no obvious way to incorporate
side constraints of the form in (13) into a maximum matching algorithm.
The structure of many organ allocation methods is hierarchical: for instance, if multiple zero-
antigen mismatches are found, a deceased donor kidney goes first to a zero-mismatch local can-
didate, second to a zero-mismatch sensitized candidate in an area that is owed a payback from
an earlier zero-mismatch transfer, third to a zero-mismatch sensitized candidate within the larger
region, and so on. A hierarchical policy for kidney paired donation could be implemented using a
hierarchical collection of subsets, say, V1, V2, . . ., Vk, and an appropriate edge-weighting. However,
we do not know the form of the Ci in general. Because preemptive weights that convert a multi-
objective maximum edge-weight matching problem into a single-objective one are known to exist,
an interesting and practical generalization of our results would be to find the Ci.
6. Computational Trials
6.1. Solution Algorithms
There are polynomial-time algorithms (e.g., Galil et al. (1986), Lova´sz and Plummer (2009)) to
produce a matching with maximum cardinality, or vertex weight, or edge weight, in an undirected
graph. In each case, the optimal matching need not be unique. The enumeration of all match-
ings with maximum cardinality or weight is a computationally difficult problem (Valiant 1979).
Thus examining all maximum cardinality matchings is not an attractive strategy for satisfying a
secondary objective subject to maximum cardinality. The size of realistic kidney paired donation
problems is fairly modest. Based on medically detailed simulations, we predict that in the most
optimistic scenarios about 750 patient-donor pairs would arrive each quarter to a national KPD
program (Gentry et al. 2005). A maximum edge-weight matching for a 750-vertex KPD graph
can be found in a few seconds using, say, the commercial graph package LEDA from Algorithmic
Solutions Software GMBH (Mehlhorn et al. 1997).
In contrast, a straightforward encoding of optimal two- and three-way allocation using CPLEX
optimization software to solve the integer program (15) detailed in Section 7.3 fails because there
are on the order of a million two- and three-way cycles in a 750-vertex directed KPD graph. We
are aware of recent progress in specialized heuristics and column generation techniques to solve
these large-scale integer programs (Abraham et al. 2007).
6.2. Computational Experiments
We used clinically realistic simulations of incompatible pairs to test our suggested edge-weight
methods against a vertex-weight method (Vertices) and the proposed UNOS edge weights (UNOS
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proposal). We compared the optimal allocations determined by these weighting methods, using
100 pools of 750 incompatible donor-recipient pairs. Results are shown in Table 1. Each row shows
outcomes for a distinct weighting scheme, and the columns in Table 1 reflect the average numbers
of: incompatible pairs that can be matched for transplantation; incompatible pairs who match to
another pair in their UNOS region and thus do not need to travel; zero-mismatch transplants;
prior live donor transplants; pediatric transplants; and sensitized transplants. The average number
of pairs of each type who were matched for five paired donation allocation schemes should be
compared to the numbers in the Totals row, which give the average number of pairs of each type in
the KPD graphs generated. As an example, the average number of pediatric recipients was about
22 out of the 750 recipients. It would not be meaningful to provide the number of edges having
certain edge properties in this row.
The columns of the table correspond to edge properties (local and zero-mismatch) and vertex
properties (prior donor, pediatric, and sensitized) that are relevant to allocation for kidney paired
donation, along with the total number of people transplanted. Each of the columns is a separate
outcome measure, and larger values are more desirable in every column. Not shown are the numer-
ical weights assigned to the properties in the columns, which differed between rows. The numerical
weights assigned for each property that pertained to a particular edge, or a vertex incident with
that edge, were summed to get the weights for each edge. The weights for edge properties were
zero in the Vertices scheme.
The Edges 1 method was suggested in Section 4.4, and it yields maximum cardinality allocations
that favor local and zero-mismatch edges. The Edges 2 method is to weight edges in the intervals (8)
of Section 5.2, and it yields a maximum V2-cardinality matching that does not necessarily have
maximum cardinality. The Edges 3 method is to weight edges in the intervals (9) of Section 5.2,
and it yields maximum cardinality and maximum V2-cardinality allocations that favor local and
zero-mismatch edges. The subset V2 is composed of: the very small group of prior live donors (about
0.05% of the total); the group of pediatric recipients (about 3%); and the large group of sensitized
recipients (about 28%). The latter group of sensitized recipients differs from the average in that
sensitized recipient vertices have very few incident edges. Pediatric and prior live donor candidates
are without connectivity bias.
The results suggest that vertex-weighting schemes are impractical because they require too many
people to travel long distances. The vertex-weighting shown is weakly Pareto-dominated by our
edge-weighting schemes. The Edges 1 weighting achieves the greatest number of local transplants
but, since it gives the vertex properties zero weight, it matches fewer pediatric and other exceptional
recipients. The UNOS proposal does not achieve the maximum number of transplants, but it does
not miss the optimum by very much, and it does achieve more zero-mismatch transplants than any
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other weighting scheme shown. This is typical of multi-objective problems; relaxing a requirement
to find the absolute maximum of one objective (cardinality or V2-cardinality) allows a rise in other
objective values. The Edges 2 weighting is similar to the UNOS weighting in that it trades off
maximum cardinality for other objectives, but Edges 2 gives up more total transplants in order
to achieve the maximum number of transplants for the exceptional recipients. We remark that
our research group contributed substantially to the UNOS proposal for edge weightings, so the
proximity between the UNOS proposal row of the table and our rows is not coincidental.
The maximum edge-weight matching for any scheme in which all properties have positive weight
is on the efficient frontier for this allocation problem (Ehrgott and Gandibleux 2000). Starting from
any of the schemes shown in which all listed properties have positive weight (these are Edges 2,
Edges 3, and UNOS ), it will not be possible to increase one outcome measure without decreasing
some other outcome measure.
7. Generalizations of Kidney Paired Donation
We introduce some variants of kidney paired donation. Many generalizations of the classic kidney
paired donation between two incompatible pairs have been proposed, mostly in response to the
difficulty of finding complementary pairs in the small registries that now exist. Some of these
alternative donation arrangements require only trivial alteration of the underlying KPD graphs,
but in some cases allocation is no longer equivalent to matching.
7.1. Compatible Paired Donation
Voluntary compatible paired donation (Gentry et al. 2007, Roth et al. 2005a) allows recipients who
have compatible donors to enter paired donation arrangements with incompatible pairs. The match
rate for incompatible pairs would nearly double if compatible pairs participated in paired donation,
because the compatibles could offset the blood type imbalance among incompatible pairs (Gentry
et al. 2007). Compatible paired donation has also been referred to as altruistically unbalanced
exchange (Ross and Woodle 2000), but we would argue that it need not be altruistically unbalanced.
Recipients with compatible donors might participate in a paired donation registry in order to find
a younger or more closely-matched donor, while others may indeed participate out of altruistic
motivation.
A KPD graph may include compatible pairs among its vertices without altering any of the
development in this paper. Compatible pairs could proceed with direct donation to the intended
recipient, which suggests that a reflexive edge (self-loop) be attached to each compatible pair vertex.
Equivalently, each compatible pair vertex could be attached to its own dummy vertex representing
direct donation.
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7.2. List Paired Donation
A New England consortium has arranged a number of list paired donations, in which a recipi-
ent’s incompatible donor gives to the person at the top of the deceased donor waiting list, and
the intended recipient is moved to the top of the waiting list for the next compatible deceased
donor organ (Delmonico et al. 2004). List paired donation can be represented in a KPD graph by
connecting a self-loop, or a dummy edge and vertex, to each incompatible pair who is eligible for
list paired donation.
Ethical objections to list paired donation have been raised. Blood type O donors are scarce
among incompatible pairs, so list paired donation will most often reallocate a type O donor away
from the waiting list in exchange for a donation from a non-O live donor to the waiting list.
This non-O for O list donation seems unfair to people waiting for a type O deceased donor, who
would see a disproportionate increase in waiting times (Zenios et al. 2001). If ethical restrictions
prevent non-O for O list paired donation, and practical restrictions prevent list paired donation
for sensitized recipients, then nearly everyone who could participate in list paired donation could
instead be matched in a national live paired donation registry (Gentry et al. 2005). Live paired
donation is preferable to list paired, because kidney allografts from living donors are expected to
function almost twice as long (median survival of 21 years versus 13 for deceased donor organs
Harihan et al. (2000)). We expect that on a national level, live paired donation will supersede list
paired donation.
7.3. Donations Among Three or More Pairs
To model allocations that allow participation of more than two pairs in a donation we use a directed
KPD graph G. There is an edge of G from one vertex to another vertex provided the donor of the
source vertex is compatible with the recipient of the target vertex. Then any directed cycle in G
is an opportunity for an exchange. We continue to refer to an k-way exchange of kidneys as paired
donation, because the incompatible donor and his intended recipient are paired.
1 2
3
4
x1 = 0 x2 = 1 x3 = 1 x4 = 0
Figure 5 A directed KPD graph with four directed cycles, two of which are selected in an allocation (bold edges).
24
When more than two pairs are allowed in an exchange, the allocations are not matchings, but
rather sets of vertex-disjoint directed cycles in the directed KPD graph G. An optimal allocation
can be found using integer (binary) programming. A simple integer program for optimal allocation,
allowing participation of at most k pairs in each exchange, proceeds as follows. Suppose G has n
vertices, and p directed cycles with at most k edges. With the i-th directed cycle we associate the
binary decision variable xi. Let xi = 1 if the i-th cycle is included in the allocation, and let xi = 0
if the i-th cycle is not included in the allocation, as in Figure 5. Let the cycle index i be in the set
Cyc(j) provided the i-th cycle contains vertex j (j = 1,2, . . . , n). Let the weight wi represent the
value of including the i-th cycle in the allocation. Then the integer program to be solved is
max
p∑
i
wixi
subject to:
∑
Cyc(j)
xi ≤ 1 for each vertex j in {1,2, . . . , n}, (15)
xi ∈ {0,1} for each cycle i in {1,2, . . . , p}.
Exchanges involving three donor-recipient pairs have been accomplished at a few transplant
centers (McLellan 2003, Montgomery et al. 2005). Saidman et al. (2006) have shown that allowing
two- and three-way matches would increase the number of transplants that can be performed,
especially in small pools of incompatible pairs. Under the assumption of large KPD graphs where
blood type incompatibilities but no tissue incompatibilities exist, Roth et al. (2007) have produced
some nice results. First, it is possible to achieve the maximum number of transplants without any
trades larger than four pairs. Second, Roth et al. (2007) have calculated an upper bound, based
on the prevalence of different blood type combinations, on how many transplants are foregone in
restricting to two- and three-way trades and how many transplants are foregone in restricting to
two-way trades.
For unrestricted k-way transfers of kidneys, Roth et al. (2004) suggest that allocation could
be accomplished via a modified top trading cycles mechanism, in which every recipient ranks the
available kidneys from most to least desirable. However, unrestricted k-way matches have been
rejected by the medical community, both because of the logistical complexity of simultaneous
transplants and the high likelihood of scuttling entire exchanges because of a medical event that
affects one donor or recipient in the cycle.
7.4. Domino Paired Donation
Altruistic individuals sometimes offer to donate a kidney to any recipient who could benefit, and
these individuals are called non-directed donors. Non-directed kidney donations have often been
Gentry, Mankowski, Michael, and Segev:
25
allocated to the recipient on the waiting list for a deceased donor kidney. Instead, in a domino
paired donation (Montgomery et al. 2006), also called a chain (Roth et al. 2006), the non-directed
donor gives to a recipient with an incompatible donor, and that donor in turn gives to a recipient on
the waiting list. The recipient with the incompatible donor benefits because he would not receive
the non-directed donation otherwise, and overall the non-directed donor makes two transplants
possible. Domino paired donations can also be extended to chains of three or more recipients,
and surgeons at Johns Hopkins Hospital recently performed a five-way domino operation. A non-
directed donor can be represented as a vertex in either a directed or an undirected KPD graph,
where the non-directed donor’s “recipient” will be a recipient on the waiting list who is compatible
with the donor at the end of the domino.
8. Discussion and Limitations
We will review some limitations of our analysis. An important limitation is that our theoretical
results about the size of maximum edge weight matchings on undirected graphs apply only to two-
way paired donation systems. It is an open question whether there exist edge weights for k-way
exchange graphs for which maximum edge-weight allocations are also certain to have maximum
cardinality. That guarantee could be made in a different way for k-way or even two-way matchings,
by first calculating the maximum cardinality of a k-way or two-way matching, and then using that
number as a lower bound on the number of transplants in (15) as a side constraint. Although this
would give an allocation with the required property, one could no longer interpret the result as
giving an edge weight system that correctly reflects the allocation objective.
No consensus on the allocation objective has been reached in the transplant community, not
even to specify that maximizing the number of transplants is required. Still, an allocation method
that maximizes the number of transplants is likely to be more palatable to donors and recipients
than one that does not.
Polynomial-time algorithms for maximum edge weight matching are well-known in the computer
science and optimization literature. However, understanding matching algorithms requires some
familiarity with optimization and primal-dual formulations. This unfortunately means that the
workings of any optimal allocation procedure will not be accessible to most transplant professionals,
which might generate some resistance to these methods. Even ascertaining the edge weights to
express a desired allocation objective will be a thorny problem, although the results we have
presented constitute a partial answer. In contrast, the allocation of deceased donor organs is much
more transparent. Because organs harvested from a deceased donor cannot be stored, each organ
is allocated in greedy fashion to the recipient with the largest number of points.
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If a KPD graph has smallest edge weight w and largest edge weight W , inequality (3) guarantees
that µe ≥ (w/W )µ. For realistic paired donation graphs, this lower bound is extremely conservative.
For instance, in the simulation results of Table 1 for UNOS and Edges 2 weightings, one cannot
use inequality (3) to give tighter bounds than (2) gives, because for the aforementioned weightings
the fraction w/W is less than 1/2. These matchings nonetheless have almost maximum cardinality
because they satisfy µe ≥ 0.99µ.
Laboratory crossmatch testing of all recipients to their potentially compatible donors in a paired
donation registry would be too expensive and difficult to undertake. Even using state-of-the-art
techniques to predict all of the sensitivities of each recipient, unpredicted positive crossmatches will
still be discovered after the maximization step. This means that any fixed allocation, including the
computed optimal allocation, may not be realizable. After laboratory screening of the exchanges in
the initial allocation, any pairs in scuttled exchanges with positive crossmatch tests can be restored
to the registry along with pairs that were unmatched initially, for a second and possibly a third or
fourth allocation step.
We have not discussed the incentive structure for individual recipients and their incompatible
donors within a kidney paired donation allocation system. A strategy-proof allocation mechanism
is one in which no participant can gain an advantage by misrepresentation. Under the assumption
that participants are indifferent among all acceptable kidneys, maximum edge-weight matching is
a strategy-proof mechanism. This result follows the argument in Roth et al. (2005b), as generalized
by Hatfield (2005).
It is critical that optimization researchers develop and disseminate appropriate allocation meth-
ods for kidney paired donation. Transplant communities in the U.S. and other countries are making
rapid progress toward national kidney paired donation systems. Allocation methods that may find
suboptimal or non-efficient allocations are known to have been used in practice. Also, physicians
may not be expert at translating their judgments about the relative value of particular paired dona-
tion matches to numerical weights. Our broader aim is to help the transplant community express
its allocation goals through the use of KPD graphs. To that end, we have provided weighting meth-
ods that give cardinality guarantees, while allowing the necessary edge preference structure. These
weighting methods can be seen as specifying the preemptive weights for converting a preemptive
multi-objective optimization model to a single-objective model. Following on the work presented
here, we are seeking simpler means for eliciting physicians’ value judgments about allocation. We
hope to supplement the trial-and-error simulations that have permeated clinical dialogue (UNOS
2006b) on the design of kidney paired donation allocation systems.
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